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I. INTRODUCTION
Criticism may not be agreeable, but it is necessary; it fulfills
the same function as pain in the human body, it calls attention
to the development of an unhealthy state of things.
Winston Churchill1

It has been said that ―the Law is what the judges declare.‖2 If so, we are
in desperate need of a second opinion. The Fair and Accurate Credit

Assistant Professor of Business Law, California State University, Northridge. J.D., magna
cum laude, University of Notre Dame Law School, 2000. This Article is dedicated to Professors
Charles E. Rice and Jay Tidmarsh, whose support, encouragement, and example continue to inspire.
1. WILLIAM MANCHESTER, THE LAST LION : WINSTON SPENCER CHURCHILL, VISIONS OF
GLORY 1874–1932, 348 (1983).
2. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 283 (Roland Gray ed., 2d
ed., Macmillan Co. 1921).
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Transactions Act 3 (the ―Statute‖) has been the source of substantial,
expensive, time-consuming litigation, stemming from a portion of the Statute
regulating the amount of information a merchant may include on a
consumer‘s credit or debit card receipt.
Shortly after Congress enacted the Statute, the overwhelming voice of
industry declared its understanding of the law: businesses may print up to the
last five digits of a customer‘s debit or credit card number, the card‘s
expiration date, or both. 4 After the fact, most courts have declared: businesses
may print the last five digits of the customer‘s credit or debit card but not the
expiration date.5
The disagreement has a certain ethereal quality to it. And while the
debate may be interesting (not unlike determining the number of angels that
can dance on the head of a pin), the consequences are costly. 6 The decision
not to allow merchants to print a credit or debit card‘s expiration date has the
potential to devastate scores of businesses and, as a consequence, wreak
serious economic havoc, while at the same time filling the coffers of many
attorneys.7 This, despite the fact that permitting the inclusion of the date
causes no harm and has the salubrious benefit of saving many a company
from financial ruin. 8
While the civil process is important, and free and open access to the courts
is central to the democratic economy, 9 it is just as important to ―balance
between access to the courts and freedom from unjustifiable lawsuits.‖10 One
way we achieve this balance is by limiting access to those who have suffered
a cognizable harm, that is, an actual injury. The Supreme Court has

3. Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006)).
4. See Credit and Debit Card Receipt Clarification Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-241, § 2(a)(3),
122 Stat. 1565, 1565 (finding that many businesses misinterpreted the original truncation
requirements).
5. See, e.g., Arcilla v. Adidas Promotional Retail Operations, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 2d 965, 970
(C.D. Cal. 2007).
6. See infra notes 27–29 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 27–29 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 27–29 and accompanying text.
9. Suzette M. Malveaux, Statutes of Limitations: A Policy Analysis in the Context of
Reparations Litigation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68, 84 (2005) (―Access to the courts is particularly
important for minorities, the poor, lower socioeconomic classes, and other disenfranchised groups
who must rely on the legal system for protection of basic human and civil rights.‖); Wendy E.
Parmet, Quarantine Redux: Bioterrorism, AIDS and the Curtailment of Individual Liberty in the
Name of Public Health, 13 HEALTH MATRIX 85, 110 (2003) (describing access to the courts as the
―indelible core of the rule of law‖).
10. Timothy P. Getzoff, Comment, Dazed and Confused in Colorado: The Relationship Among
Malicious Prosecution, Abuse of Process, and the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 67 U. COLO. L. REV.
675, 678 (1996).
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specifically cautioned against ―abandoning the requirement that the party
seeking review must himself have suffered an injury.‖11 Without real harm,
the aggrieved may not turn to the courts for relief. 12
Where there is no harm, there should be no access; hence, the problem
with the current spate of lawsuits. Or, more precisely, with that portion of the
Statute that requires merchants to truncate certain information printed on their
customer‘s receipt (hereinafter, ―FACTA‖). 13 Congress created the truncation
requirement with the best of intentions, i.e., to protect unwarranted access to
private financial information. The problem, however, is that the information
being protected (primarily a credit or debit card‘s expiration date) has little to
do with protecting private financial records and little to do with the actual
requirements of FACTA. It is, however, a source of seemingly endless
litigation with minimal benefit to the litigants, but which provides plaintiffs‘
attorneys with a potential windfall. 14 This is especially so where, as here, the
government has created litigation incentives by way of statutorily mandated
damages (including minimum recoveries, attorney fees, and punitive
damages), even where the plaintiff has not suffered any harm and cannot
suffer actual harm.15
This does not mean that the Statute must be scrapped. The Statute
provides several important tools in the battle against identity theft. 16 But
FACTA needs to be revised to protect merchants from unwarranted litigation.
11. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738 (1972).
12. While I am mindful that Congress may create statutory rights, the invasion of which creates
the harm necessary to open the doors of the court, Hedlund v. Hooters of Houston, No. 2:08-CV-45,
2008 WL 2065852, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 13, 2008), ―the plaintiff still must allege a distinct and
palpable injury to himself, even if it is an injury shared by a large class of other possible litigants,‖
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975). For this reason, courts are rightly hesitant to grant relief
for a mere technical violation of the law. See, e.g., Tice v. Centre Area Transp. Auth., 247 F.3d 506,
520 (3d Cir. 2001) (affirming summary judgment, holding ―there is no indication in either the text of
the ADA or in its history that a technical violation of § 12112(d) was intended to give rise to
damages liability‖); Mihalek Corp. v. Michigan, No. 92-1641, 1993 WL 460787, at *3 (6th Cir. Nov.
9, 1993) (―In this case, even if there was a technical violation of 17 U.S.C. § 106, [Plaintiff] suffered
no substantial harm, if any, from such violation. Therefore, [Plaintiff] is not entitled to a remedy for
the alleged violation of his rights.‖); Schulist v. Blue Cross, 717 F.2d 1127, 1133, 1134 (7th Cir.
1983) (noting a lack of injury ―by these technical violations of the statute‖ and affirming ―the action
of the district court in dismissing all the ERISA claims‖).
13. See Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159, § 113, 117
Stat. 1952, 1959 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g)(1) (2006)).
14. Lawrence W. Schonbrun, The Class Action Con Game, 20 REGULATION 50, 53 (1997).
15. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n–1681o (2006).
16. Andrew Capalbo, Developments in Banking Law: 2004, 24 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L.
1, 49–51 (2005) (describing various privacy protection tools, including: allowing ―consumers to
exclude most of their social security number from their credit file,‖ requiring ―businesses to provide
the transaction records to identity theft victims,‖ and requiring that ―cred itors abide by fraud-alert
statements that consumers may put on their credit file, which means that a lender must contact the
consumer before granting credit in their name‖).
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All laws are designed to serve various social policies, primarily to serve the
public good by protecting individuals from actual harm.
Attorney
compensation has not, however, topped the list of justifications sufficient for a
particular statutory scheme. Yet, that appears to be the primary outcome of
FACTA.
To better understand the statutory purpose and context, this Article begins
with a brief introduction to FACTA‘s structure and then explores several of
the more pressing problems flowing from what has become a tidal wave of
FACTA litigation. In particular, it will examine the following: problems
raised by a recent attempted legislative fix, interpretive challenges
surrounding FACTA‘s truncation requirements, due process concerns raised
by FACTA‘s compensatory scheme, and significant procedural issues flowing
from the structure of the lawsuits (i.e., problems with the lawsuits as putative
class actions). It then concludes by examining potential solutions to some of
the thornier problems raised by FACTA‘s implementation.
II. THE FACTA FACTS
Get your facts first, and then you can distort them as much as
you please.
Mark Twain17

The Statute, which amends the Fair Credit Reporting Act (―FCRA‖), was
enacted into law in 2003 but did not become fully effective until December
2006.18 Chief among its stated purposes is the prevention of ―identity theft.‖19
To that end, FACTA requires businesses to limit the amount of information
printed on credit and debit card receipts:
Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, no person
that accepts credit cards or debit cards for the transaction of
business shall print more than the last 5 digits of the card

17. Jeffrey A. Peck & Jodi Sydell Rosenzweig, Closing Argument, 194 N.J. LAWYER, Dec.
1998, at 39.
18. Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006)); FED. TRADE COMM‘N, SLIP SHOWING? FEDERAL LAW
REQUIRES ALL BUSINESSES TO TRUNCATE CREDIT CARD INFORMATION ON RECEIPTS (2007),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/business/alerts/alt007.pdf (explaining the December
2006 effective date) (last visited Jan. 17, 2009).
19. Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006)); FED. TRADE
COMM‘N, supra note 18.
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number or the expiration date upon any receipt provided to
the cardholder at the point of the sale or transaction.20
This one sentence has spawned hundreds of lawsuits against numerous
retail businesses by consumers seeking to enforce FACTA‘s truncation
requirement. 21 The FCRA permits lawsuits for either negligent or willful
violations of FACTA. Plaintiffs who are successful in proving a negligent
violation may recover actual damages, costs of the suit, and reasonable
attorney fees. 22 Plaintiffs who are successful in proving a willful violation
may recover actual damages or statutory damages of not less than $100 and
not more than $1000, costs of litigation together with attorney fees, and
punitive damages.23
Not surprisingly, most, if not all, of the pending lawsuits allege that
defendants willfully violated FACTA and, as a general rule, claim statutory
damages only.24 The lion‘s share of the FACTA lawsuits have been filed as
putative class actions, which means that the litigant seeks relief on behalf of a
class of individuals that received receipts that contained more information
than FACTA permits.25 Significantly, the FCRA, and therefore FACTA, does
not cap the total damages recoverable in a consumer class action lawsuit. 26
This is important because, calculated on a per violation basis, total damages
can be devastating.27 One court, for example, estimated that for a potential
class of 2.9 million people ―statutory damages alone would range from a
minimum of $290 million to a maximum of $2.9 billion.‖28 Such damages are
typically greater than the merchant‘s net worth. 29
Until recently, most of these lawsuits were filed in the federal district
courts in the state of California. The reason was simple enough. The Ninth
20. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g)(1) (2006); see also Iosello v. Leiblys, Inc., 502 F. Supp. 2d 782, 786
(N.D. Ill. 2007) (―Congress enacted FACTA with the intent of helping to prevent the possibility of
thieves stealing the identity of another by obtaining one‘s credit card number and the expiration date
of that credit card.‖).
21. Credit and Debit Card Receipt Clarification Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-241, § 2(a)(4),
122 Stat. 1565, 1565 (―Almost immediately after the deadline for compliance passed, hundreds of
lawsuits were filed alleging that the failure to remove the expiration date was a willful violation of
the Fair Credit Reporting Act even where the account number was properly truncated.‖).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 1681o (2006).
23. 15 U.S.C. § 1681n (2006).
24. See, e.g., Iosello, 502 F. Supp. 2d at 783.
25. See, e.g., Arcilla v. Adidas Promotional Retail Operations, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 2d 965, 967
(C.D. Cal. 2007).
26. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a) (2006).
27. See, e.g., Lopez v. KB Toys Retail, Inc., No. CV 07-144-JFW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
82025, at *14 (C.D. Cal. July 17, 2007).
28. Id. (emphasis omitted).
29. See, e.g., id. (―$290 million represents more than 600% of Defendant‘s net worth.‖).
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Circuit defined ―willful‖ to include not only knowing acts, but also reckless
ones.30 On June 4, 2007, the United States Supreme Court ruled that ―willful‖
included both intentional and reckless acts.31 Given this more relaxed
standard, combined with the large potential damage awards, FACTA has
become a growing source of supply for the lawsuit industry. 32 The question,
therefore, is whether these lawsuits should be allowed to continue. This
Article suggests they should not. It offends fundamental notions of fairness
when litigants, without actual injury (and without the prospect of actual
injury), are allowed to use the courts as a means of financial gain. It is within
the court‘s power to stop the litigation at an early stage. However, if the
courts refuse to stem the litigation tide, Congress should act—now.
III. CONGRESS‘S ATTEMPTED FIX
The mistakes made by Congress wouldn‘t be so bad if the
next Congress didn‘t keep trying to correct them.
Cullen Hightower 33

On June 3, 2008, President Bush signed into law the Credit and Debit
Card Receipt Clarification Act of 2007.34 The Clarification Act is a limited
attempt to restrict merchant liability related to FACTA‘s truncation
requirement. 35 The new law provides, in relevant part:
(a) In General.—Section 616 of the Fair Credit Reporting
Act (15 U.S.C. § 1681n) is amended by adding at the
end the following new subsection:
(d) Clarification of Willful Noncompliance.—For the
purposes of this section, any person who printed an
expiration date on any receipt provided to a consumer
cardholder at a point of sale or transaction between
December 4, 2004, and the date of the enactment of this
subsection but otherwise complied with the requirements
of section 605(g) [15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g)] for such receipt
shall not be in willful noncompliance with section 605(g)
by reason of printing such expiration date on the receipt.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
U.S.C.).
35.

Reynolds v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Group, Inc., 435 F.3d 1081, 1099 (9th Cir. 2006).
Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 127 S. Ct. 2201, 2208 (2007).
See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
THE QUOTABLE POLITICIAN 141 (William B. Whitman ed., 2003).
Pub. L. No. 110-241, 122 Stat 1565 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
Id.
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Scope of Application.—The amendment made by
subsection (a) shall apply to any action, other than an
action which has become final, that is brought for a
violation of 605(g) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act to
which such amendment applies without regard to
whether such action is brought before or after the date of
the enactment of this Act.36

Unfortunately, the Clarification Act is flawed in several important ways.
First, the law provides a narrowly tailored remedy that applies retrospectively
only, and for a limited period of time. 37 It limits liability for ―willful
noncompliance‖ for the time period from December 4, 2004, to June 3, 2008
(the date the Clarification Act was signed into law). 38 In effect, the
Clarification Act gives merchants one free bite at the apple. That is, the law
appears to say: ―Okay, you were wrong, but we won‘t count it against you—
just don‘t do it again.‖ Respectfully, this is a less than satisfying response. If
it is unlawful to print a card‘s expiration date, we must wonder why—why
allow merchants to abuse their customers for a limited period of time? On the
other hand, if as the law suggests, ―proper truncation of the card number, by
itself as required by the amendment made by [FACTA], regardless of the
inclusion of the expiration date, prevents a potential fraudster from
perpetrating identity theft or credit card fraud‖39 then why limit the time to
which the Clarification Act applies? It would have been better had Congress
simply solved the problem by amending FACTA to eliminate any cause of
action based on inclusion of the card‘s expiration date.
Second, while the law will likely limit (or eliminate) certain of the
pending FACTA actions, it also heightens the danger that any future
violations will be construed as willful due to the publicity surrounding the
current FACTA lawsuits as well as passage of this law. 40 This last point
received some attention before the bill became law. 41 In late 2007, in
response to a merchant‘s motion to dismiss a FACTA lawsuit based, in part,
on the Clarification Act, District Judge Virginia M. Kendall presciently
observed:

36. Id. § 3
37. See id. § 3(a).
38. Id.
39. Id. § 2(a)(6).
40. See id. §§ 2–3.
41. See NAT ‘L SMALL BUSINESS ASS‘N, CREDIT AND DEBIT CARD RECEIPTS COULD LEAD TO
COURT (2007), http://www.nsba.biz/content/printer.1578.shtml (last visited Jan. 17, 2009).
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While the Bill does suggest that some merchants may have
misunderstood the truncation requirement in § 1681c(g), the
Bill would not amend that section. Instead, the bill proposes
the addition of a new subsection to § 1681n [regarding
damages], which proposed subsection provides that:
For the purposes of this section, any person who printed an
expiration date on any receipt provided to a consumer
cardholder at a point of sale or transaction between
December 4, 2004 and the date of the enactment of this
subsection but otherwise complied with the requirements
of section 605(g) [1681c(g)] for such receipt shall not be in
willful noncompliance with section 605(g) by reason of
printing such expiration date on the receipt. (emphasis
added).
Even if the Court were to consider the Bill in reaching its
decision in this case, it would only bolster this Court’s
conclusion that printing an expiration date on any receipt
provided to a consumer cardholder constitutes a violation
of § 1681c(g).42
While possibly assisting certain merchants with some of the pending
FACTA lawsuits, the new law fails to resolve and, going forward, may
heighten the risks associated with FACTA enforcement. Finally, Congress
did nothing to address the bigger problem of total recoverable damages. It
simply makes no sense not to cap total damages, especially where courts have,
in other contexts, found that the failure to include a statutory cap is fatal. 43
Thus, the problems with FACTA may be with us for some time to come.

42. Follman v. Village Squire, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 816, 821 n.3 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (bold
emphasis added).
43. See, e.g., In re Trans Union Corp., 211 F.R.D. 328, 349 (N.D. Ill. 2002). The Trans Union
court stated:
Recently, [Federal District Courts in] both the Western District of Missouri and
the Eastern District of New York have relied on the reasoning of Ratner and its
progeny to reject class actions under the Cable Communications Act of 1984
(―Cable Act‖), 47 U.S.C. § 551(f) which, like the FCRA and pre-amendment
[Truth In Lending Act], provides for actual damages but not less than minimal
statutory recovery, with no cap on class action damages.
Id. (citing Parker v. Time Warner Entm‘t Co., 198 F.R.D. 374, 381 (E.D.N.Y. 2001); Wilson v. Am.
Cablevision of Kansas City, Inc., 133 F.R.D. 573 (W.D. Mo. 1990)).
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IV. NO HARM NO FOUL
Who wants a nation of law-abiding citizens? What‘s there in
that for anyone? But just pass the kind of laws that can
neither be observed nor enforced nor objectively
interpreted—and you create a nation of law-breakers—and
then you cash in on guilt.
Ayn Rand44

Congress enacted FACTA to reduce the incidents of consumer identity
theft.45 Insofar as FACTA accomplishes this goal, it furthers the good of
society.46 For example, a person who has been the victim of identity theft
should be allowed to pursue all civil remedies. So too, a person who has
suffered a statutory injury (i.e., a person has not been defrauded, but the
statutory violation exposes the person to a threat of real harm) should be
allowed to prove his or her case. However, FACTA goes much further than
merely preventing harm or punishing either the fraudster or those who enable
the fraudulent act. Instead, FACTA improperly provides a mechanism for
punishing a merchant where there has been no harm: no identity theft and no
real possibility of identity theft.47
FACTA requires merchants to remove from the consumer receipt all but
the last five digits of the credit or debit card number and, potentially, the
card‘s expiration date.48 While there is some debate whether the Statute
requires merchants to remove the card‘s expiration date when the receipt has
otherwise been properly truncated, 49 it is widely understood that leaving the
expiration date on the otherwise truncated receipt does not increase the risk of
identity theft.50 ―Experts in the field agree that proper truncation of the card
number, by itself as required by [FACTA], regardless of the inclusion of the

44. AYN RAND, ATLAS SHRUGGED 436 (1957).
45. Lawrence A. Young & Patrick McCarren, Just the FACT(s), Ma’am—A Roadmap to the
FACT Act, 59 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 239, 240 (2005) (―One of the major goals of the FACT Act
was to address this problem, to implement procedures to reduce identity theft and fraud, and as
possible to prevent them from happening altogether.‖).
46. See id.
47. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 580 (1996) (―The principle that
exemplary damages must bear a ‗reasonable relationship‘ to compensatory damages has a long
pedigree.‖).
48. Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159, § 113, 117 Stat.
1952, 1959 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681c (2006)).
49. See cases cited infra note 52.
50. Credit and Debit Card Receipt Clarification Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-241 § 2(a)(6),
122 Stat 1565, 1565.
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expiration date, prevents a potential fraudster from perpetrating identity theft
or credit card fraud.‖51
This Article takes no exception to those lawsuits in which plaintiffs‘
claims are based on receipts that include both the card‘s expiration date and
more than the card‘s last five digits. However, for the many suits arising out
of a technical violation of the law (i.e., the card numbers are properly
truncated, but the receipt included the card‘s expiration date), 52 relief should
be denied.
51. Id.; see also Seig v. Yard House Rancho Cucamonga, L.L.C., No. CV 07-2105 PA, 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97209, at *16 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2007) (―[I]t appears unlikely, if not impossible,
for the inclusion of the expiration date on a debit card receipt to result in identity theft or any other
actual harm.‖); Medrano v. Modern Parking, Inc., No. CV 07-2949 PA, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
82024, at *17 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007) (same); Evans v. U-Haul Co. of Cal., No. CV 07-2097 JFW,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82026, at *17 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2007) (same); Soualian v. Int‘l Coffee &
Tea L.L.C., No. CV 07-502 RGK, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44208, at *10 (C.D. Cal. June 11, 2007)
(―[I]t appears virtually impossible for the inclusion of the expiration date on a credit card or debit
card receipt to result in identity theft or any other actual harm.‖); Spikings v. Cost Plus, Inc., No. CV
06-8125 JFW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44214, at *13 (C.D. Cal. May 25, 2007) (―[I]t appears
unlikely, if not impossible, for the inclusion of the expiration date on a credit card or debit card
receipt to result in identity theft or any other actual harm.‖). But see Ramirez v. Midwest Airlines,
Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1163–64 (D. Kan. 2008) (―The primary purpose of the expiration date on
a Visa card is fraud detection and prevention.‖); Arcilla v. Adidas Promotional Retail Operations,
Inc., 488 F. Supp. 2d 965, 972 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (denying defendant‘s motion to dismiss based on
failure to eliminate the expiration date, holding that although plaintiff‘s loss was ―small and hard to
quantify,‖ plaintiffs properly alleged ―actual harm‖ in the form of an ―increased risk of identity
theft‖).
52. See, e.g., Ramirez, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 1163 (―It is undisputed that the receipt she was given
contained the last four digits of her credit card number as well as her card‘s expiration date.‖);
Follman v. Village Squire, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 816, 819 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (―Follman alleges that
VSI [violated § 1681c(g)] when it provided him with a receipt that included his card‘s expiration
date.‖); Gueorguiev v. Max Rave, L.L.C., 526 F. Supp. 2d 853, 856 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (―Plaintiff . . .
alleges Max Rave violated . . . FACTA . . . when it printed a cash register receipt which displayed
plaintiff‘s card expiration date.‖); Halperin v. Interpark, Inc., No. 07C2161, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
87851, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 2007) (―The receipt contained the last four digits of his card number
and the card‘s expiration date.‖); Hile v. Frederick‘s of Hollywood Stores, Inc., No. 07-0715 SC,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81105, at * 2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2007) (Plaintiff alleges that he ―was
provided a receipt that contained the expiration date of Plaintiff‘s credit card.‖); Follman v.
Hospitality Plus of Carpentersville, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 2d 960, 962 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (―On or about
April 24, 2007, and May 8, 2007, plaintiff received a computer-generated receipt from Culver‘s
which displayed plaintiff‘s card expiration date.‖); Reynoso v. S. County Concepts, No. SACV 07373 JVS, 2007 WL 4592119, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2007) (―Reynoso alleges that on March 21,
2007 he received from TAPS a receipt for his credit or debit card purchase that included the
expiration date of the card in violation of [FACTA].‖); Harris v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 07CV2561,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76012, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 10, 2007) (―The computer-generated receipt for
the transaction that Harris received from Wal-Mart displayed the expiration date for his credit card.);
Korman v. Walking Co., 503 F. Supp. 2d 755, 757–58 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (―She alleges Defendant
provided her with a receipt that contained 4 digits from her credit card account number and also
contained her credit card‘s expiration date.‖); Iosello v. Leiblys, Inc., 502 F. Supp. 2d 782, 783
(N.D. Ill. 2007) (―According to Iosello, he made a purchase from Leiblys using his credit card on or
about January 21, 2007, and the receipt for the transaction contained the expiration date of Iosello‘s
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The policy reasons are simple enough. Courts are loath to impose
crushing liability for technical violations of a statutory scheme. 53 A long
recognized judicial principle provides that ―where the penalty prescribed is so
severe and oppressive as to be wholly disproportioned to the offense and
obviously unreasonable‖ the penalty violates due process and is, therefore,
without effect.54 A corollary to this principle provides ―that a statutory
damages provision that grossly exceeds any actual damages would violate due
process as ‗an irrational and arbitrary deprivation of the property of the
defendant.‘‖55 Actual damages based on including the debit or credit card‘s
expiration on the customer receipt (again, assuming that the card has
otherwise been properly truncated) appear to be zero. Where there is no
harm, there can be no proportionality to the award and, therefore, any award
would be unreasonable and arbitrary. ―While a plaintiff is allowed to opt for
statutory damages in lieu of actual damages, this option is not intended to
provide the plaintiff with a windfall recovery.‖ 56
credit card.‖); Najarian v. Charlotte Russe, Inc., No. 07-501, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59879, at *3
(C.D. Cal. June 12, 2007) (―Defendant printed the expiration date of Plaintiff‘s credit card on a
receipt provided to Plaintiff‖); Najarian v. Avis Rent A Car System, No. 07-588 RGK, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 59932, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 11, 2007) (―Some Check Out Rental Agreements issued by
Defendants between December 4, 2006 and January 26, 2007 (the Class Period) contained Prohibited
Information (the expiration date of the customer‘s credit or debit card).‖); Lopez v. Gymboree Corp.,
No. C 07-0087 SI, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44461, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 9, 2007) (―Plaintiff alleges
that Gymboree violated . . . FACTA when . . . Gymboree printed the expiration date of plaintiff‘s
credit card on a receipt provided to plaintiff.‖); Arcilla, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 967 (―Plaintiff Eugelio
Arcilla claims that . . . Adidas printed him a receipt containing information that FACTA prohibited—
namely, the expiration date of his credit card.‖).
53. See, e.g., Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 776 (3d Cir. 1974). The Katz court
reasoned:
[T]he recovery in this action might run as high as $80,000,000, even if only
minimum damages were sought by each plaintiff. Such a liability could
conceivably bankrupt the defendant, and force it to cease operation. This
prospect of a ―horrendous, possibly annihilating punishment‖ for a technical
violation of the Act is certainly a relevant consideration in any inquiry into the
―superiority‖ of a class action as a means of enforcing the statute.
Id.; Ratner v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (―[T]he proposed
recovery of $100 each for some 130,000 class members would be a horrendous, possibly annihilating
punishment, unrelated to any damage to the purported class or to any benefit to defendant, for what is
at most a technical and debatable violation of the Truth in Lending Act.‖). But see Murray v. GMAC
Mortgage Corp., 434 F.3d 948, 953 (7th Cir. 2006) (―[I]t lies in the legislative decision to authorize
awards as high as $1,000 per person.‖).
54. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 66–67 (1919); Parker v. Time
Warner Entm‘t Co., 331 F.3d 13, 26 (2d Cir. 2003); see also United States v. Citrin, 972 F.2d 1044,
1051 (9th Cir. 1992).
55. DirecTV, Inc. v. Spillman, No. Civ.A.SA-04-82-XR, 2004 WL 1875045, at *4 (W.D. Tex.
Aug. 23, 2004) (quoting State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 429 (2003)).
56. Warner Bros., Inc. v. Dae Rim Trading, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 740, 769 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(discussing violations of the Copyright Act).
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As Judge Newman of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
recently observed, ―[e]ven if a massive aggregation of minimum statutory
damages survives constitutional scrutiny, there is a substantial question
whether the Congress that authorized payments of $1,000 for [violations of
the statute] expected 12 million of them each to receive such an amount for a
somewhat technical violation.‖57 While the court was discussing the Cable
Communications Policy Act (―CCPA‖), its reasoning applies with equal force
to technical violations of FACTA. The CCPA is similar to FACTA in that it
provides for actual damages (with a minimum statutory damage award of
$100 to $1000), punitive damages, and attorney fees.58 Both are consumer
protection statutes. There is little to be protected where actual damages
approach zero and little to be gained by imposing crushing, companydestroying damage awards.
V. IT MEANS WHAT?
Law . . . must be judged by the results it achieves, not by the
niceties of its internal structure; it must be valued by the
extent to which it meets its end, not by the beauty of its
logical processes or the strictness with which its rules proceed
from the dogmas it takes for its foundation.
Roscoe Pound59

FACTA presents certain interpretive difficulties, chief of which is whether
the Statute requires or merely permits the merchant to eliminate the expiration
date from an otherwise properly truncated receipt. If the Statute requires
merchants to eliminate the expiration date, then we are left with an
unfortunate anomaly—that is, a statutory scheme at odds with a near universal
business interpretation. While not inconceivable from an interpretive
standpoint, this reading would expose merchants to potentially disastrous
liability.
FACTA‘s remedies also raise serious due process concerns. The Statute
provides for statutory damages from a minimum of $100 per violation to a
maximum of $1000 per violation. 60 The trouble with this sliding scale is that
57. Parker, 331 F.3d at 26 (Newman, J., concurring) (discussing the Cable Communications
Policy Act).
58. 47 U.S.C. § 551(f)(2) (2006). While the statute provides for a range of damages, they are
limited to actual damages with a statutory floor of $100 per day or $1000, whichever is higher. Id.
This is an important distinction because, as discussed more fully in the void-for-vagueness section,
FACTA provides for damages where there has been no harm and provides a sliding scale of relief on
a per transaction basis of $100 minimum to $1000 maximum. 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a) (2006).
59. Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 605 (1908).
60. 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1)(A) (2006).
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jurors have no guidelines—no way of determining (apart from guessing) the
amount of the award. It cannot be based on pure conjecture; otherwise the
award is speculative and void. 61 Neither can it be based on culpability;
otherwise it becomes nothing more than a secondary source of punitive
damages.
A correlative point is whether, assuming FACTA does not allow a
merchant to include the expiration date on the consumer receipt, the
merchant‘s interpretation is ―objectively unreasonable‖ or ―merely careless.‖ 62
If it is objectively unreasonable, the violation is more likely willful. If,
however, it is merely careless or a reasonable business interpretation, the
violation, if any, will more likely be negligent. The willfulness-negligence
distinction is important primarily as it relates to damages. 63 In a negligence
context, plaintiffs are not entitled to statutory damages (the only type of
damage that appears to be at issue in the current spate of lawsuits). 64
At the heart of this discussion is the critical issue of statutory
interpretation, or more precisely, whether FACTA is too vague to enforce. A
statute may be overly vague in one, or both, of two interrelated senses. First,
a statute may be so vague that no reasonable interpretation is possible. 65 This
level of vagueness offends constitutional sensibilities, and the statute is,
therefore, void.66 Second, a statute may be enforceable, but it is open to
competing reasonable interpretations, 67 in which case the question is: ―whose
interpretation controls?‖
A. Is FACTA too Vague to Enforce?
Hence debates in that great body often become vague and
tortuous and seem to drag their feet rather than march straight
for their stated goal. Something analogous to this will, I
61. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Receivable Fin. Co., 501 F.3d 398, 414 (5th Cir. 2007) (―Further,
even if this court could otherwise uphold the verdict for fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud, the
damages award was based on conjecture and speculation as to what amount the defendants obtained
through A&I‘s fraud, and therefore it, too, cannot be sustained.‖); Sir Speedy, Inc. v. L & P
Graphics, Inc., 957 F.2d 1033, 1038 (2d Cir. 1992) (―In order to recover damages, a claimant must
present evidence that provides the finder of fact with a reasonable basis upon which to calculate the
amount of damages. He need not prove the amount of loss with mathematical precision; but the jury
is not allowed to base its award on speculation or guesswork.‖); Combined Network, Inc. v.
Equitable Life Assurance Soc‘y of the U.S., 805 F.2d 1292, 1299 (7th Cir. 1986) (―[A] trier of fact
may not award damages on the basis of conjecture or guesswork.‖).
62. See Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 127 S. Ct. 2201, 2215 (2007).
63. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1681n (2006) (willful violations) with 15 U.S.C. § 1681o (2006)
(negligent violations).
64. § 1681o.
65. See Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 511 (1989).
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think, always take place in the public assemblies of
democracies.
Alexis de Tocqueville68

The Constitution establishes drafting boundaries for all federal statutory
schemes. 69 If the statute fails to meet constitutional standards, it is void. 70
―The void-for-vagueness doctrine reflects the principle that ‗a statute which
either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that [persons]
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to
its application, violates the first essential of due process of law.‘‖ 71 Simply
put, the statute must be understandable by the average, reasonably intelligent
person.
As it pertains to FACTA, there are two dimensions to the void-forvagueness argument. The first is whether FACTA‘s truncation requirements
are clear, that is, whether reasonably intelligent business people are able to
discern the basic requirements of FACTA such that they can apply its
restrictions and prohibitions without having to speculate as to what they are.
The second is whether courts can fairly apply FACTA‘s statutory damage
scheme. Here, the question is whether the Statute provides a reasonable factfinder (typically a jury) adequate guidelines for fairly meting out damage
awards, or whether the fact-finder is left to its own devices to guess at the
appropriate award. As to the first, courts have generally concluded that
FACTA is clear and unambiguous, 72 though it is far from clear that their
reasoning is clear and unambiguous. As to the second, there is limited case
law on point, but what is available tends to demonstrate a real constitutional
problem with the statutory scheme.
The first issue thus becomes whether the Statute ―provide[s] people of
ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what conduct it
prohibits.‖73 The second issue is whether the statutory scheme ―authorizes or
even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.‖74

68. 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 577 (Arthur Goldhammer trans.,
Literary Classics of the U.S., Inc. 2004).
69. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 731–32 (2000).
70. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 629 (1984).
71. Id. (quoting Connally, 269 U.S. at 391).
72. See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
73. Hill, 530 U.S. at 732; see also Arcilla v. Adidas Promotional Operations, Inc., 488 F. Supp.
2d 965, 970 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (―Thus, the question here is essentially whether § 1681c(g) is
sufficiently clear that its prohibitions would be understood by an ordinary person operating a profitdriven business.‖).
74. Hill, 530 U.S. at 732.
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1. FACTA‘s Truncation Requirement
Most of the research which is done is determined by the
requirement that it shall, in a fairly obvious and predictable
way, reinforce the approved or fashionable theories.
Celia Green75

Typically, courts find that the wording of the truncation requirement
leaves little room for debate, generally relying on the Supreme Court‘s
instruction that ―economic regulation is subject to a less strict vagueness test
because its subject matter is often more narrow, and because businesses,
which face economic demands to plan behavior carefully, can be expected to
consult relevant legislation in advance of action.‖ 76 In holding that the
truncation requirement is clear, however, the courts place undue emphasis on
the somewhat relaxed ―economic regulation‖ standard but fail to give any real
weight to the express limitations, i.e., whether the legislation is sufficiently
narrow such that reasonably prudent business people can understand its
meaning, given their ability to consult appropriate authority in advance of
pertinent business decisions.77
Congress designed FACTA to aid in the prevention of ―identity theft.‖78
Identity theft is defined to mean ―a fraud committed using the identifying
information of another person . . . .‖79 Most FACTA lawsuits are based on
allegations that the named defendant(s) failed to remove the expiration date
from the offending receipt.80 Thus, the question here is whether ―an ordinary
person operating a profit-driven business‖ would understand that the Statute
required the removal of the expiration date in order to effectuate the Statute‘s
goal of preventing identity theft.81
While FACTA is facially narrow (at least concerning information that
may be printed on a credit card receipt), it appears as though merchants had
little or no opportunity to ―consult relevant legislation in advance of action.‖ 82

75. Interview by Jayne Gackenbach with Celia Green, author of Lucid Dreams (1991),
available at http://sawka.com/spiritwatch/interview_with_celia_ green.htm (last visited Jan. 17,
2009).
76. See, e.g.,Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498
(1982) (footnote omitted).
77. See id.
78. See generally Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117
Stat. 1952 (―An Act to amend the Fair Credit Reporting Act, to prevent identity theft . . . .‖) (codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 1681a (2006)).
79. § 111, 117 Stat. at 1954.
80. See cases cited supra note 52.
81. Iosello v. Leiblys, Inc., 502 F. Supp. 2d 782, 785 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
82. See Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 498.
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Other than the FACTA text, there is no indication that the business
community was able to access other relevant legislation to clarify or explain
FACTA‘s truncation requirements. There is also significant evidence tending
to show that merchants, while truncating debit and credit card numbers,
reasonably believed the Statute did not require the removal of the expiration
date. 83
This reasonable belief is all that is necessary84 and should have forced the
courts to tip the scales in the merchant‘s favor. The Supreme Court, in an
analogous case regarding the application of the FCRA, concluded that the
plaintiff was not entitled to damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a) for a willful
violation of the FCRA, making the following important points: first, ―[t]his is
not a case in which the business subject to the Act had the benefit of guidance
from the courts of appeals or the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) that might
have warned it away from the view it took.‖ 85 Second, even though the
defendant‘s reading of the statute was ―erroneous,‖ it was not ―objectively
unreasonable‖ in large part due to the ―dearth of guidance and the less-than
pellucid statutory text.‖86 So too, the merchants in the FACTA cases had no
guidance from the courts of appeals or the FTC, and the statutory text (as
explained in more detail below) is less than clear as to the truncation
requirements. 87 Such vagaries should not become the foundation on which we
base statutory liability. 88

83. See NAT‘L SMALL BUSINESS ASS‘N, supra note 41.
84. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681o (2006).
85. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 127 S. Ct. 2201, 2216 (2007).
86. Id. at 2204.
87. In May 2007, the FTC released an FTC Business Alert in which it explained that merchants
―may include no more than the last five digits of the card number, and . . . must delete the card‘s
expiration date.‖ FED. TRADE COMM ‘N, supra note 18. This alert, however, appears to be too little,
too late. FACTA had been in force for at least six months by the time this alert (which, at just over
one page, is awkwardly brief) was released. Furthermore, the force of this alert is less than clear. As
the Supreme Court explained: ―Before these [FCRA] cases, no court of appeals had spoken on the
issue, and no authoritative guidance has yet come from the FTC (which in any case has only
enforcement responsibility, not substantive rulemaking authority, for the provisions in question).‖
Burr, 127 S. Ct. at 2216 (citations omitted). Furthermore, it is of some interest to note that in a June
15, 2004, release, the FTC, in explaining the protections provided by FACTA, noted that FACTA
―will require that account numbers on credit card receipts be shortened or ‗truncated‘ so that
merchants, employees, or others who may have access to the receipts do not have access to
consumers‘ names and full credit card numbers‖ but said nothing about the expiration date. Press
Release, Fed. Trade Comm‘n, Provisions of New Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act Will
Help Reduce Identity Theft and Help Victims Recover (June 15, 2004), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/06/factaidt.shtm (last visited Jan. 17, 2009).
88. While the Supreme Court has ―recognized that a scienter requirement may mitigate a law‘s
vagueness,‖ Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982),
FACTA does not require a showing of scienter but is, instead, a statute imposing strict liability. See
Grimes v. Rave Motion Pictures Birmingham, L.L.C., 552 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1306 (N.D. Ala. 2008).
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The Clarification Act further supports the proposition that merchants
reasonably understood FACTA‘s truncation requirements to permit the
inclusion of the card‘s expiration date. 89 As noted earlier, the legislation
amends the ―[FCRA] to make technical corrections to the definition of willful
noncompliance with respect to violations involving the printing of an
expiration date on certain credit and debit card receipts before the date of the
enactment of this Act.‖90 As part of the new law, Congress found, ―[m]any
merchants understood that this [the truncation] requirement would be satisfied
by truncating the account number down to the last 5 digits based in part on the
language of the provision as well as the publicity in the aftermath of the
passage of the law.‖91 Accordingly, ―any person who printed an expiration
date on any receipt‖ during the safe-harbor period ―shall not be in willful
noncompliance . . . by reason of printing such expiration date on the
receipt.‖92 Moreover, ―[e]xperts in the field agree that proper truncation of
the card number, by itself as required by [FACTA], regardless of the inclusion
of the expiration date, prevents a potential fraudster from perpetrating identity
theft or credit card fraud.‖93 Thus it seems unlikely that a reasonable business
person would understand that removal of the credit card‘s expiration date was
required for the prevention of identity theft.
Given the expert testimony, the new law (albeit flawed), and the clear and
unambiguous voice of the business community, it seems fair to say that
merchants reasonably believed they were allowed to include the expiration
date on a consumer receipt.94 All of this makes the near universal judicial
pronouncement as to the clarity of the Statute all the more puzzling.95 Where
89. Credit and Debit Card Receipt Clarification Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-241, 122 Stat.
1565.
90. Id.
91. Id.; see also NAT ‘L SMALL BUSINESS ASS‘N, supra note 41 (―Unfortunately, [FACTA] was
written in such a vague way that many businesses thought they were in compliance by printing only
the last five digits of the card number and the expiration date.‖); Press Release, Nat‘l Restaurant
Ass‘n, National Restaurant Association Hails FACTA ―Fix‖ (Nov. 2, 2007), available at
http://www.restaurant.org/pressroom/print/index.cfm?ID=1517 (―FACTA has created an enormous
amount of confusion among business owners‖) (last visited Jan. 17, 2009).
92. Credit and Debit Card Receipt Clarification Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-241, § 3(a), 122
Stat. 1565, 1566.
93. § 2(a)(6), 122 Stat. at 1565.
94. This point is further reinforced by President Bush‘s Fact Sheet when he signed FACTA into
law. That Fact Sheet, while stating FACTA requires ―merchants to leave all but the last five digits of
a credit card number off store receipts,‖ is silent as to the expiration date. Press Release, The White
House, Fact Sheet: President Bush Signs the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003
(Dec. 4, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031204-3.html
(last visited Jan. 15, 2009).
95. See, e.g., Hedlund v. Hooters of Houston, No. 08-CV-45, 2008 WL 2065852, at *4 (N.D.
Tex. May 13, 2008); Korman v. Walking Co., 503 F. Supp. 2d 755, 760 (E.D. Pa. 2007); Iosello v.
Leiblys, Inc., 502 F. Supp. 2d 782, 786 (N.D. Ill. 2007); Blanco v. El Pollo Loco, Inc., No. SACV
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merchants reasonably, and in good faith, believe (albeit erroneously) a statute
to have a particular meaning and application, action consistent therewith
cannot amount to a willful violation of the law. 96 Indeed, the court in Blanco
v. El Pollo Loco, Inc. recognized that a merchant‘s reasonable understanding
of the statute‘s requirements could preclude a finding of willfulness, but
refused to take action because the case was still in the early stages of
litigation. 97 But that is exactly when the reasonableness determination needs
to be made. 98
Because the costs of litigation can be substantial, defendants are under
tremendous pressure to settle, ―regardless of the cases‘ merits.‖99 Courts deny
approximately ninety percent of all motions to dismiss. 100 This pressure
becomes particularly problematic for defendants facing potentially ruinous
litigation. 101 ―Settlement is usually the most rational option, regardless of
individual case facts.‖102 For courts to fail or refuse to take early action is
tantamount to approving what has euphemistically been referred to as ―strike
suits,‖103 that is, suits brought to force settlement, regardless of merit, merely
because the risk of loss is too great. The judicial branch should not
countenance such legislative policies.

07-54 JVSRNBX, 2007 WL 1113997, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2007); Aeschbacher v. Cal. Pizza
Kitchen, Inc., No. CV 07-215 VBFJWX, 2007 WL 1500853, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2007).
96. Reynolds v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Group, Inc., 435 F.3d 1081, 1099 (9th Cir. 2006) (ruling
that a company will not be liable under 15 U.S.C. § 1681n for willfully or recklessly violating a
consumer‘s rights if the ―company . . . has diligently and in good faith attempted to fulfill its
statutory obligations and to determine the correct legal meaning of the statute and has thereby come
to a tenable, albeit erroneous, interpretation of the statute‖).
97. Blanco, 2007 WL 1113997, at *2 (―How El Pollo Loco read the statute is, of course,
relevant to whether it acted willfully. . . . Whether El Pollo Loco made a plausible interpretation of
the law or acted diligently and in good faith, however, are not questions that can be answered at the
pleading stage.‖) (denying a motion to dismiss).
98. A motion to dismiss is a device used to dispose of a case at the pleadings stage, before
expensive, time-consuming discovery forces heavy costs on litigants. See Burgess v. City & County
of San Francisco, No. 91-15084, 1992 WL 26545, at *2 (9th Cir. Feb. 18, 1992). While courts are
typically limited to the information in the complaint for purposes of a motion to dismiss, the court
may go outside the four corners of the document by converting the motion to dismiss to a motion for
summary judgment. Id. (―A district court has discretion to convert a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6) to a motion for summary judgment.‖).
99. Schonbrun, supra note 14, at 52.
100. Id.
101. See id.
102. Id.
103. A strike suit is defined as a ―suit (esp. a derivative action), often based on no valid claim,
brought either for nuisance value or as leverage to obtain a favorable or inflated settlement.‖
BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 1448 (8th ed. 2004).
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2. FACTA‘s Damages Scheme
According to the law of nature it is only fair that no one
should become richer through damages and injuries suffered
by another.
Marcus Tullius Cicero104

Equally problematic is FACTA‘s enforcement mechanism. FACTA‘s
mandatory damage scheme, 105 divorced from any showing of actual harm,
appears to serve as much to punish as it does to deter. That is, rather than
protect from the possibility of real harm, it imposes liability regardless of
harm. As such, due process concerns are at the fore and the protection of
unwarranted deprivation must be guarded against. The Fifth Amendment
prohibits the deprivation of ―life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.‖106 Justice Douglas, in striking down such an offense on due process
grounds, opined: ―[a]s Holmes wrote in The Common Law, ‗A law which
punished conduct which would not be blameworthy in the average member of
the community would be too severe for that community to bear.‘‖107
Addressing this issue head-on, Senior District Judge William M. Acker,
Jr. recently explained:
The most obvious denial of ―due process‖ that facially
appears in [FACTA] comes from its vague description of the
damages that must be awarded to a single victim against a
single vendor for a single willful failure to truncate a
customer‘s electronically produced credit card receipt, even
though no actual damages are sustained. Under
§ 1681(n)(a)(1)(A), anyone who seeks actual damages must
prove those damages and must prove that they were
proximately
caused
by
the
vendor‘s
willful
noncompliance. . . . Without having sustained actual
damages, credit-card using customers, whether or not they
trolled for their non-compliant receipts, can sue their vendors
if the vendor recklessly disregarded the FACTA obligation to
truncate the credit card receipt (something relatively easy to
prove) and can automatically recover ―damages of not less
than $100 and not more than $1,000‖ for each violation. If

104. NORBERT GUTERMAN, THE ANCHOR BOOK OF LATIN QUOTATIONS: WITH ENGLISH
TRANSLATIONS 393 (1990).
105. 15 U.S.C. § 1681n (2006).
106. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
107. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 229 (1957) (quoting OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES,
JR., THE COMMON LAW 50 (1881)).
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the same customer returns to the same establishment five
times in five hours and uses his credit card each time, there
will be five FACTA violations, each of which will trigger a
strict liability recovery of “not less than $100 and not more
than $1,000[.”] The possibility for a misuse of credit cards
by customers reaches astronomical proportions more than
the possibility of misuse of credit card information by
thieves.108
FACTA‘s due process problem is not so much with the fact of a sliding
scale, as the lack of any standards by which that scale may be fairly applied. 109
Here, defendants are at risk of losing substantial property rights—in some
instances more than the net worth of the business. The loss of any such right
must be fairly guarded. One way we protect those rights is by way of a jury
trial.110 ―Jury trials require understandable and rational criteria for any award
of damages. If the statutory damages in FACTA were fixed at a stationary
$500 instead of an indeterminate amount, the preparation and delivery of a
jury charge would be simple and constitutional. Congress, instead, here said
―not less than $100 and not more than $1,000.‖111
How does a jury know whether to award $100, $200, $300, or, for that
matter, any amount between $100 and $1000? Adding to the complication is
the fact that a jury may have to make that decision hundreds of times for each
defendant, depending on the number of receipts issued (both in total and per
customer). How can a jury fairly decide that defendant‘s identical action
justifies an award of $100 to Plaintiff A, but should be $200 to Plaintiff B?
One thing is certain, it cannot be based on the defendant‘s level of culpability;
otherwise statutory damages become punitive damages and, as FACTA
already allows for a separate award of punitive damages, there would be an
unlawful double penalty.112 If the award is not rationally tied to the violation,
108. Grimes v. Rave Motion Pictures Birmingham, L.L.C., 552 F. Supp. 2d. 1302, 1305–06
(N.D. Ala. 2008).
109. See id. at 1306.
110. Id.
111. 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1)(A) (2006).
112. See, e.g., Grimes, 552 F. Supp. 2d at 1307. As the Grimes court put it:
If, as some plaintiffs argue, Congress meant in § 1681n(a)(1)(A) implicitly to
allow a jury to slide between $100 and $1,000, depending upon what it finds to
be the degree of a particular defendant‘s willfulness, the word ―willful‖ will
receive a new meaning. Nothing in the FACTA language suggests any
difference between how a jury is to react to slight willfulness and to serious
willfulness. . . . If the degree of willfulness is a matter for jury consideration, a
subsequent award of punitive damages is the remedy expressly provided for
punishing egregious conduct. . . . Any adjustment upward from the FACTA
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it is arbitrary and, therefore, constitutionally suspect.113 ―[T]he statute here
under consideration provides no guidance for deciding between $100 and
$1,000, leaving it to the whim of the jury, that is, unless the court violates the
doctrine of separation of powers and assumes the role of legislator as the only
way to make sense of the present nonsensical language.‖114
Granting various merchants‘ motions for summary judgment, Judge Acker
summarized FACTA‘s constitutional hurdle, a hurdle he determined to be
insuperable:
Courts and juries cannot be called upon to make up
the rules as they go. Courts cannot be expected to tell a jury,
―Just do what you think is right‖ (so long as you do not
award less than $100 or more than $1,000). ―Doing what is
right‖ does not meet the standard of ―due process‖. Many a
jury has done what it thought was right, and it was wrong. As
an enforcer of the Seventh Amendment, this court must insist
upon a jury‘s having a chance at fairly performing its
adjudicative function and not simply flying by the seat of its
pants.
The words ―not less than $100 and not more than
$1,000‖ constitute an almost perfect illustration of the
concept ―void for vagueness‖. There is no way short of
legislation to remove the vagueness and ambiguity in these
words. . . .
If a jury is allowed to wander indiscriminately
between $100 and $1,000 for each willful FACTA violation,
one jury can decide that a particular violation calls for $100,
while another jury can decide that precisely the same
violation by the same vendor is worth $1,000, while other
juries can, willy nilly, award something in between.

minimum $100 would necessarily be punitive, and therefore would trespass
upon the punitive damages provision that immediately follows. ‗Due process‘
does not tolerate a defendant‘s being punished twice for the same conduct.
Id.; see also In re Trans Union Corp., 211 F.R.D. 328, 341 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (citing as a ―basic notion
that a double penalty for the same act violates due process‖). While the Trans Union court upheld
the general statutory scheme in § 1681n(a)(1)(A), it did not address the more pressing question here;
whether the statutory damages could be fairly applied (that is, whether there were fair standards or if
the statutory penalty was based on the level of one‘s culpability), ruling merely that statutory
damages were in lieu of actual damages and, therefore, did not amount to a double penalty. See 211
F.R.D. at 341.
113. See Grimes, 552 F. Supp. 2d at 1307.
114. Id. at 1306.
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Congress is, of course, presumed to know what it is doing, a
presumption here in jeopardy. . . .
....
If the classic words ―void for vagueness‖ have
meaning, they perfectly describe this statutory language. The
language simply creates an unmanageable problem for courts
who cannot be expected to be draftsmen and to judicially
innovate solutions that would be an exercise of the legislative
function.115
Judge Acker neatly penetrates to the heart of the problem. Either
FACTA‘s statutory damages are void due to a lack of standards by which a
jury can fairly determine the appropriate amount of damage, or they violate
constitutional norms as a double penalty because they require consideration of
the defendant‘s level of culpability (something more properly considered as
part of any punitive damage award). Either way, the statutory scheme is
constitutionally defective.
B. Whose Interpretation Controls?
A judge should interpret the law, not make it.
Senator Charles Schumer 116

Courts have generally concluded that a properly truncated receipt means a
receipt that includes no more than the last five digits of the consumer‘s credit
or debit card number and does not include any portion of the card‘s expiration
date. 117 Merchants, on the other hand, while generally reaching the same
conclusion as to the truncation of the credit and debit card numbers,
concluded that the Statute permitted them to include the expiration date. 118
For purposes of our discussion here, we will assume FACTA passes
constitutional muster but may suffer from an interpretive defect such that it
reasonably calls into question the willfulness of the alleged violation. The
task then is to determine how best to understand the words of the Statute. ―As
Judge Learned Hand advised, statutes ‗should be construed, not as theorems
115. Id. at 1306–07.
116. Sen. Charles Schumer, Remarks on Alito Nomination (Oct. 31, 2005), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/31/AR2005103100707.html
(last
visited Jan. 17, 2009).
117. See cases cited supra note 52.
118. Credit and Debit Card Receipt Clarification Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-241, § 2(a)(3),
122 Stat. 1565, 1565.
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of Euclid, but with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind
them.‘‖119 For this reason, a ―statute is to be read as a whole, since the
meaning of statutory language, plain or not, depends on context.‖120 As we
have repeatedly observed, and as the language of the text makes clear, the
context and central purpose of FACTA is the prevention of identity theft. 121
With respect to 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g)(1), the interpretive issue concerns
whether the Statute permits or requires merchants to eliminate the credit or
debit card‘s expiration date from the issued receipt. On its face, the Statute
provides that ―no person . . . shall print more than the last 5 digits of the card
number or the expiration date upon any receipt . . . .‖122 For the most part, the
lower courts have concluded that the Statute is subject to only one reasonable
interpretation; that is, merchants are required to remove the expiration date
from their customer‘s receipt. In doing so, however, the courts have not
explained how this interpretation squares with either the canons of statutory
construction, the purpose of the Statute, or the statutory context.
As to the canons, the trial courts ask us to believe that the words ―last 5
digits‖ apply only to the card number but not the expiration date. 123 The
problem with this construction is that it does not comport with the natural
reading of the text. It is, by now, a widely recognized maxim that ―[w]hen
several words are followed by a clause which is applicable as much to the first
and other words as to the last, the natural construction of the language
demands that the clause be read as applicable to all.‖124 While this rule is
often referred to as the Doctrine of the Last Antecedent, its application is not
limited to the words immediately preceding the phrase; instead, ―[w]here the
sense of the entire act requires that a qualifying word or phrase apply to
several preceding or even succeeding sections, the word or phrase will not be
restricted to its immediate antecedent.‖ 125 So then, the phrase ―last 5 digits‖
should apply to the whole, that is, to both the card‘s numbers as well as the
card‘s expiration date.
Furthermore, any decision regarding the removal of the expiration date
should flow from a reasonable showing that such removal advances the
119. Conn. Nat‘l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 255 n.1 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(quoting Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage, 218 F. 547, 553 (2d Cir. 1914), cert. denied, 235
U.S. 705 (1915)).
120. King v. St. Vincent‘s Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991) (citations omitted).
121. Ehrheart v. Verizon Wireless, 547 F. Supp. 2d 463, 464 (W.D. Pa. 2007) (―Congress
enacted FACTA . . . in part to assist victims of identity theft.‖).
122. 15 U.S.C. §1681c(g)(1) (2006).
123. See cases cited supra note 52.
124. Porto Rico Ry., Light & Power Co. v. Mor, 253 U.S. 345, 348 (1920) (citing United States
v. Standard Brewery, 251 U.S. 210 (1920)).
125. Kasischke v. State, 991 So. 2d 803, 812 (Fla. 2008) (quoting 2A NORMAN J. SINGER &
J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.33 (7th ed. 2007)).
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statutory scheme of protecting the consumer‘s identity. Here, however, there
appears to be no positive correlation between the removal of the expiration
date and identity theft. To the contrary, the evidence suggests that inclusion
of the expiration date on an otherwise properly truncated receipt does not
increase the risk of identity fraud.126
So then, if including the expiration date on the receipt does not materially
increase the risk of identity theft, how is one to think about the expiration
language in the Statute? Here, defendants posit at least two viable readings of
the Statute. First, ―the statute could be read to ‗allow a business to print the
credit card‘s expiration date on the receipt so long as no more than the last 5
digits of the card appear.‘‖127 Second, the Statute ―could be read so that the
phrase ‗last 5 digits‘ modifies both ‗card number‘ and ‗expiration date,‘ and
thus the business would be in compliance so long as it truncated the card
number and printed only the last five digits of the expiration date.‖ 128
Courts have criticized this first option as leading to the ―absurd result that
a firm could print an entire card number so long as it omitted the expiration
date.‖129 This is not necessarily so. It could as easily mean (and apparently a
great many merchants took it to mean) that a merchant may print the
expiration date on the receipt but must not print more than the last five (5)
digits of the credit or debit card. This interpretation would have the
salubrious effect of promoting consumer protection, merchant freedom, and
would comport with both the language and intent of the Statute.
Courts have discounted the second option because the ―majority of
expiration dates are only four digits long, while others are six or at most eight
digits, e.g., MM/YY, MM/YYYY, MM/DD/YY or MM/DD/YYYY‖ and,
therefore, permitting a merchant to print the last five digits will not
accomplish the statutory goal of preventing a ―would-be identity thief‖ from
discerning ―the entire expiration date.‖ 130 But this contention seems to miss
the point. First, Congress may decide to permit date truncation, whatever the
courts think of the policy. Second, as the inclusion of the expiration date does
not increase the risk of identity theft when the receipt does not otherwise
reveal more than the last five digits of the credit or debit card, any concern to
the contrary is unfounded.
126. See cases cited supra note 51.
127. Arcilla v. Adidas Promotional Retail Operations, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 2d 965, 970 (C.D. Cal.
2007) (citation omitted).
128. Id.; see also Follman v. Hospitality Plus of Carpentersville, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 2d 960, 964
(N.D. Ill. 2007).
129. Arcilla, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 970; see also Follman, 532 F. Supp. 2d at 964 (―[The first
reading] would permit a merchant to include the entire card number on the receipt, so long as the
expiration was left off.‖).
130. Follman, 532 F. Supp. 2d at 964.
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Moreover, even if the language could be read to preclude inclusion of the
expiration date, courts are ―limited in their application as not to lead to
injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence. It will always, therefore, be
presumed that the legislature intended exceptions to its language, which
would avoid results of this character. The reason of the law in such cases
should prevail over its letter.‖131 To allow recovery for what is little more
than a technical violation would be patently absurd. FACTA was designed as
a tool in the battle against identity theft, not a tool for the personal enrichment
of either counsel or litigant.
VI. GANG (I.E., CLASS ACTION) LAWSUITS MUST BE STOPPED
Litigation, n. A machine which you go into as a pig and come
out of as a sausage.
Ambrose Bierce132

Many pending FACTA lawsuits have been filed as class actions. The
class action lawsuit is a popular litigation tool. 133 It allows plaintiffs (known
and unknown) to band together as a single entity to bring their claims against
one or more defendants.134 In order to proceed as a class, plaintiffs must
demonstrate: (1) ―the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable‖; (2) ―there are questions of law or fact common to the class‖;
(3) ―the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the
claims or defenses of the class‖; (4) ―the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class‖; (5) ―questions of law or fact
common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members‖; and (6) ―a class action is superior to other available
methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.‖ 135 For
purposes of the recent FACTA actions, many of the courts have focused on
whether the class action device is the superior means of resolving the instant
dispute. 136

131. United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482, 486–87 (1868).
132. Bartlett H. McGuire, Reflections of a Recovering Litigator: Adversarial Excess in Civil
Proceedings, 164 F.R.D. 283, 283 (1996) (quoting AMBROSE BIERCE, THE DEVIL‘S DICTIONARY
194 (1911)).
133. See Schonbrun, supra note 14, at 50.
134. See id.
135. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a), (b)(3).
136. See, e.g., Blanco v. CEC Entm‘t Concepts, No. CV 07-0559 GPS, 2008 WL 239658, at *1
(C.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2008).
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In determining superiority, the courts have attempted to balance the policy
favoring court access against the potential for debilitating harm. 137 To that
end, the results have been mixed. While there seems to be general consensus
that debilitating damages should be avoided, the question becomes one of
procedure or timing. Many of the district courts within the Ninth Circuit have
concluded that the size of the potential award is a factor in determining the
superiority of the action,138 whereas district courts within the Seventh Circuit
have been more inclined to assess the due process concerns of large damage
awards only after final liability has been determined. 139 Again, this wait-andsee attitude has substantial potential consequences, chief of which is the
concern with wringing an unfair settlement from a merchant justifiably
concerned with unknown liability and the uncertainty of the litigation process.
There is simply no good reason not to settle this matter at the earliest stage
possible. Certainly, by the time a court hears a motion for class certification,
it has enough information to assess the constitutional issues.
A. David Versus Goliath
In a world filled with Davids, no one roots for Goliath.
Wilt Chamberlain140

At the heart of the class action device is a policy favoring the aggregation
of small claims.141 ―By establishing a technique whereby the claims of many
individuals can be resolved at the same time, the class suit both eliminates the
possibility of repetitious litigation and provides small claimants with a method
of obtaining redress for claims which would otherwise be too small to warrant
individual litigation.‖142 ―Where it is not economically feasible to obtain
relief within the traditional framework of a multiplicity of small individual
suits for damages, aggrieved persons may be without any effective redress
unless they may employ the class-action device.‖143
―Accordingly, class treatment of claims is most appropriate where it is not
‗economically feasible‘ for individuals to pursue their own claims.‖ 144 On the
other hand, where, as in the case of FACTA, a statutory scheme provides ―for
137. See id.; see also In re H & R Block Mortgage Corp., 244 F.R.D. 490, 495 (N.D. Ind.
2007).
138. E.g., Blanco, 2008 WL 239658, at *2.
139. E.g., In re H & R Block Mortgage Corp., 244 F.R.D. at 495.
140. David J. Johns, Wilt Chamberlain, in AFRICAN AMERICAN ICONS OF SPORT : TRIUMPH,
COURAGE, AND EXCELLENCE 61, 63 (Matthew C. Whitaker ed., 2008).
141. See Schonbrun, supra note 14, at 50.
142. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 560 (2d Cir. 1968).
143. Deposit Guar. Nat‘l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980).
144. Coleman v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 296 F.3d 443, 449 (6th Cir. 2002).
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the award of attorney‘s fees and costs to successful plaintiffs [it] eliminates
any potential financial bar to pursuing individual claims.‖145 Here, because
the law provides for sizeable statutory damages, compensates for the cost of
counsel, and offers the possibility of substantial punitive damage awards,
moving forward as a class action is unnecessary.
In addition, the class device loses much of its appeal when, instead of
compensating a litigant for harm suffered, it is used as a club to wring
settlements from defendants—settlements, the bulk of which are minimally
distributed to the actual litigant but from which the attorneys are richly
rewarded. 146 For example:
In 1993, class action attorneys sued General Chemical
Corporation over an accidental release of sulfuric acid from
its facility in Richmond, California. At its highest level of
concentration, the amount of sulfuric acid released in the
onetime event was a small fraction of the daily exposure limit
allowed by California safety laws. Plaintiffs‘ lawyers hired
―representatives‖ to scour the neighborhood. They
successfully signed sixty thousand clients. Thirty thousand
residents flooded local hospitals but treating doctors claimed
that very few had any significant injury. It was reported that
neighbors in adjacent communities came to the area in order
to become clients in the litigation. The chemical firm‘s
insurance company settled the case for $180 million, $50
million of which went to the lawyers. The average payment
to class members was under $1,000.147

145. Id. at 449 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(d) (2006)) (vacating class certification order due, in
part, to the ―[Equal Credit Opportunity Act‘s] provision for the award of attorney‘s fees and costs to
successful plaintiffs‖); see also Forman v. Data Transfer, 164 F.R.D. 400, 404 (E.D. Pa. 1995). The
Forman court denied class certification to plaintiffs suing under the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act, in part because:
The statute provides for a minimum recovery of $500 for each violation as well
as treble damages if the plaintiff can prove willful or knowing violation. This
most likely exceeds any actual monetary loss . . . suffered by most plaintiffs in
such a case. The statutory remedy is designed to provide adequate incentive for
an individual plaintiff to bring suit on his own behalf.
Id.; Wilson v. Am. Cablevision of Kansas City, 133 F.R.D. 573, 579 (W.D. Mo. 1990) (―The Cable
Act provides every individual subscriber to cable television with an appropriate remedy by way of
individual actions for violations of the requirement of that Act, including but not limited to the
recovery of damages, attorney‘s fees and court costs.‖).
146. Schonbrun, supra note 14, at 53.
147. Id. at 52.
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This case exemplifies the problems merchants face when courts refuse to
look at the underlying realities of the case. Where, as in the FACTA actions,
the plaintiffs have not been harmed, individual lawsuits provide an adequate
remedy, and the potential liability for a technical statutory violation is large,
the courts must take action to stem the tide by refusing to certify these classes.
B. You Want Me to Pay HOW MUCH?!
Please, sir . . . I want some more.
Oliver Twist

148

When actual damages are relatively low and potential liability is high,
courts should be, and frequently are, less inclined to certify a class action. 149
In what may be considered the seminal analysis on this issue, Judge Frankel in
Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co.150 observed, ―the allowance of
thousands of minimum recoveries like plaintiff‘s would carry to an absurd and
stultifying extreme the specific and essentially inconsistent remedy Congress
prescribed as the means of private enforcement.‖ Moving on to a more
detailed discussion of statutory remedies, Judge Frankel opined:
148. CHARLES DICKENS, OLIVER TWIST 11 (Kathleen Tillotson ed., 1966).
149. London v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 340 F.3d 1246, 1255 n.5 (11th Cir. 2003). The Eleventh
Circuit reversed a grant of class certification for plaintiffs suing under the Truth In Lending Act, in
part because:
Under such circumstances, even though economic harm is not an element of the
Florida common law claim for restitution, it may be required for superiority
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This is especially likely when, as in
the present suit, the defendants‘ potential liability would be enormous and
completely out of proportion to any harm suffered by the plaintiff.
Id.; Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226, 234–35 (9th Cir. 1974) (observing the lack of
superiority when damages ―shock the conscience‖); Legge v. Nextel Commc‘ns, Inc., No. 028676DSF, 2004 WL 5235587, at *13 (C.D. Cal. June 25, 2004) (―Nextel argues that the class action
procedure should not be used as a mechanism to impose ‗super penalties.‘ The Court finds this
argument persuasive. Allowing this case to proceed as a class action has potentially ruinous
results—without concomitant benefit to the class.‖); In re Trans Union Corp., 211 F.R.D. 328, 351
(N.D. Ill. 2001) (finding that FCRA class action lacked superiority in part because statutory damages
would be ―grossly disproportionate to any actual damage‖ suffered); Berkman v. Sinclair Oil Corp.,
59 F.R.D. 602, 608 (N.D. Ill. 1973). The Berkman court stated that:
It is well settled that the class action device is inappropriate in Truth in Lending
cases where, as in the instant action, the size of the potential class, coupled with
the statutory minimum recovery of $100 would result in absurdly high or
ruinous damages, wholly unrelated to the actual harm caused by the violations.
Id. But see Braxton v. Farmer‘s Ins. Group, 209 F.R.D. 654, 662 (N.D. Ala. 2002) (holding that a
large potential damage award is not a basis for denying class certification where the FCRA requires a
showing of willfulness).
150. 54 F.R.D. 412, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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Students of the Rule have been led generally to recognize
that its broad and open-ended terms call for the exercise of
some considerable discretion of a pragmatic nature.
Appealing to that kind of judgment, defendant points out that
(1) the incentive of class-action benefits is unnecessary in
view of the Act‘s provisions for a $100 minimum recovery
and payment of costs and a reasonable fee for counsel; and
(2) the proposed recovery of $100 each for some 130,000
class members would be a horrendous, possibly annihilating
punishment, unrelated to any damage to the purported class or
to any benefit to defendant, for what is at most a technical and
debatable violation of the Truth in Lending Act. These points
are cogent and persuasive. . . . It is not fairly possible in the
circumstances of this case to find the . . . class action
‗superior to‘ this specifically ‗available [method] for the fair
and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 151
Following Ratner, courts routinely refused to certify class actions based
on alleged violations of the Truth in Lending Act (―TILA‖). 152 ―Recognizing
the problems, Congress amended TILA in 1974, eliminating the minimum
statutory recovery and placing a limit of the lesser of $100,000 or 1 percent of
the net worth of the creditor, on the total recovery in class actions.‖153 As
with the pre-amended version of TILA, the FCRA and, hence, FACTA, places
no cap on total damages.154 Even among the more hesitant courts, this
argument has had a sobering effect. Denying certification in In re Trans
Union Corp., District Judge Gettleman concluded:
Although certification should not be denied solely because of
the possible financial impact it would have on a defendant,
consideration of the financial impact is proper when based on
the disproportionality of a damage award that has little
relation to the harm actually suffered by the class, and on the
due process concerns attended upon such an impact.155
The dangers of class certification are simply too great. Certifying a class
where potential damages are a ―horrendous, possibly annihilating punishment,
unrelated to any damage to the purported class or to any benefit to the
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at 416.
See, e.g., In re Trans Union Corp., 211 F.R.D. at 348.
Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 408(a), 88 Stat. 518 (1974)).
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n–1681o (2006).
In re Trans Union Corp., 211 F.R.D. at 351.
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defendant‖156 for what is, at most, merely a ―technical violation of FACTA‖ 157
is contrary to constitutional norms. Indeed, as Judge Gary L. Lancaster
recently observed:
Although FACTA is a relatively recent statute, the veritable
onslaught of class action litigation brought pursuant to the
statute has given rise to a line of cases in the United States
District Court for the Central District of California holding
that FACTA class actions do not satisfy the superiority prong
of Rule 23(b)(3) because they would expose the defendant to
ruinous damages in violation of the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 158
Unfortunately some businesses, fearing the uncertainty of the litigation
process, have opted to settle rather than risk an unknown and potentially
catastrophic judgment.159
While numerous courts have denied class
certification due to the real possibility of ruinous damages, other courts have
refused to address the damages issue until after a class has been certified, 160
thus increasing the possibility of what has been fairly termed a ―blackmail
settlement,‖161 that is, ―settlements induced by a small probability of an
immense judgment in a class action.‖162 As Judge Jerry E. Smith explained,
―The risk of facing an all-or-nothing verdict presents too high a risk, even
156. Ratner, 54 F.R.D. at 416.
157. Blanco v. CEC Entm‘t Concepts L.P., No. CV 07-0559 GPS, 2008 WL 239658, at *1
(C.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2008); see also Serna v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. CV 07-149 AHM, 2008
WL 234197, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2008) (―Defendant‘s alleged violations . . . really are merely
technical.‖); Klingensmith v. Max & Erma‘s Rests., Inc., No. CV 07-0318, 2007 WL 3118505, at *4
(E.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2007) (―damages for technical violation (i.e., absent allegations of actual injury)
are statutorily mandated‖); In re H & R Block Mortgage Corp., 244 F.R.D. 490, 496 (N.D. Ind.
2007) (―[A] FACTA violation is a mere technical violation.‖); Soualian v. Int‘l Coffee & Tea L.L.C.,
No. CV 07-502 RGK, 2007 WL 4877902, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2007) (―[H]aving the expiration
date on credit card and debit card receipts was a technical violation of FACTA.‖).
158. Palamara v. Kings Family Rests., No. CV 07-317, 2008 WL 1818453, at *3 (W.D. Pa.
Apr. 22, 2008); see also Blanco, 2008 WL 239658, at *2 (denying class certification, ruling: ―the
potential damages at issue are grossly disproportionate to the alleged injury (i.e., potential threat of
identity theft rather than actual harm)‖); Dister v. Apple-Bay E., Inc., No. C 07-01377 SBA, 2008
WL 62280, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2008) (―As in Soualian, the present case involves no allegations
of actual harm to individual plaintiffs, but does involve potentially large penalties ‗in excess of $217
million based solely on an alleged technical violation that resulted in no harm to Plaintiff or anyone
else.‘‖). But see Kesler v. Ikea U.S. Inc., No. SACV 07-568 JVS, 2008 WL 413268, at *8 (C.D. Cal.
Feb. 4, 2008) (―[C]oncerns about the constitutionality of any damage award are better addressed at
the damages phase of the litigation and not as part of class certification.‖).
159. See, e.g., Palamara, 2008 WL 1818453; Klingensmith, 2007 WL 3118505.
160. Murray v. GMAC Mortgage Corp., 434 F.3d 948, 954 (7th Cir. 2006).
161. See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995).
162. Id.
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when the probability of an adverse judgment is low.‖163 And as the Supreme
Court warned, ―Certification of a large class may so increase the defendant‘s
potential damages liability and litigation costs that he may find it
economically prudent to settle and to abandon a meritorious defense.‖ 164
Fortunately, nothing requires courts to wait until after certification to
address due process concerns stemming from potentially crushing liability.
As Judge Otis Wright explained, ―The Court believes putting a company out
of business for failing to excise the expiration dates from credit card
receipts—especially without proof of actual harm, is the type of undesirable
result that the Advisory Committee and the Ninth Circuit warned against.‖ 165
There is simply nothing in the requirements of the class action device that
prevents courts from considering potential harm to the defendant. To the
contrary, fundamental rules of fairness should motivate courts to do just that.
C. There Has to Be a Better Way
Litigation is the pursuit of practical ends, not a game of chess.
Felix Frankfurter166

So if class action treatment is inappropriate, what are plaintiffs‘ options?
The Blanco court suggests three alternatives: first, ―FACTA provides for the
recovery of attorneys fees and punitive damages[,] [giving] individuals an
incentive to [bring individual lawsuits as] an alternative to bringing a class
action‖; second, ―the Advisory Notes to Rule 23 state that there may be
‗greater practical advantages‘ to other methods such as consolidating cases‖;
and third, ―there are other federal enforcement alternatives, such as through
the Federal Trade Commission.‖167 Indeed, given the number of reasonable
alternatives, the lack of any real harm, and the potential for crushing liability
for what is, at most, a mere technical violation, there is no good reason to
permit class treatment.
VII. CONCLUSION
Reasoning draws a conclusion . . . but does not make the
conclusion certain . . . unless the mind discovers it by the path
of experience.

163. Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 1996).
164. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 476 (1978).
165. Azoiani v. Love‘s Travel Stops & Country Stores Inc., No. RDCV 07-90 ODW, 2007 WL
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The main problem with FACTA has not necessarily been with the law but
with the way in which the courts have applied the law. With few exceptions,
the trial courts have declared a rather fuzzy law to be clear. They have found
within its words meaning to which they alone are privy, that is, that the
Statute clearly forbids the printing of a card‘s expiration date. In doing so, the
courts have failed to consider reasonable alternative readings as well as the
problems associated with potentially crushing damages—damages based on a
vague statutory scheme, which, in all likelihood, violate defendants‘ due
process rights. While the Clarification Act may provide temporary relief for
certain plaintiffs involved in the current spate of lawsuits, the new law creates
as many problems as it solves. Most significantly, the law fails to address the
two most pressing problems. First, the law fails to address whether printing a
card‘s expiration date constitutes a violation of FACTA (here, the
Clarification Act offers a band-aid answer: ―maybe‖). Second, the law fails to
correct the due process concerns raised by the Statute‘s compensatory
scheme, i.e., the failure to include a cap on total damages and the failure to
offer any guidelines for determining the range of permissible statutory
damages.
So, how do we fix these problems? While comprehensive legislation is
the most desirable solution, it seems unlikely, especially given the
compromises made to pass the Clarification Act. Most of the work, therefore,
needs to be done at the courthouse. Until the judiciary is willing to look
behind the surface appeal of these mass produced lawsuits, the outlook for
merchants is less than rosy. The future is not, however, bleak. To the extent
more judges can be persuaded to follow the common sense approach of Senior
District Judge William M. Acker in the Grimes case, the more likely we are to
find reasonable solutions. To that end, this Article has presented some of the
more pressing arguments swirling around FACTA and presented alternate
points of view, in the hope of sparking further dialogue to facilitate a
reasonable resolution of these thorny issues.
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